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1. CRITICAL DAYS OF THE SHOGUNATE 
The last fifteen years of the Tokugawa ShOgunate 
represent the period in which the Shogunate experienced 
the greatest unrest and underwent the most profound changes 
in its history. In this period a last supreme effort was 
made to prop up the tottering edifice, and various reforms, 
which were against its traditional policy, were carried out. 
All this, however, failed to avert the collapse of the edifice. 
In June of the 6th year of Ka·ei (1853), the first year 
of these last fifteen years, Commodore Perry arrived at 
Uraga in command of four warships, and in July of the 
same year, the Russian Admiral Putiatin entered Nagasaki 
with four warships. Commodore Perry's projectedexpedi· 
tion had been known to the ShOgunate the previous year 
through information given by the Deshima Factor, and yet 
when it did actually take place, the whole country was 
thrown into utter consternation, especially 'great being the 
alarm caused in Edo. 
Commodore Perry presented the letter of the President 
of the United States of America, to the Shogunate, which 
also accepted presents from him. To the request of the 
American Government for the establishment of diplomatic 
and trade relations, however, the Shogunate reserved its 
definite reply, promising to give it the following year. 
Admiral Putiatin, the Russian Envoy, besides asking for the 
opening of diplomatic and commercial relations, proposed 
the delimitation of the Russian and Japanese territories in 
the Northern Seas. To his request also the Shogunate 
refused to give any definite reply. There soon ensued a 
heated controversy in this country as to whether Japan 
r 
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should be opened to foreign intercourse or whether it should 
remain closed. Some were for peace and others were for 
war. Commodore Perry came to Uraga again in January of 
the following year (1854), and asked for a definite reply. 
This finally led to the conclusion 'of the so-called Treaty of 
Kanagawa, consisting of twelve articles. In this treaty, the 
opening of the ports of Shimada and Hakodate to foreign 
intercourse was promised. This having created· a precedent, 
similar treaties were signed with Britain in August and 
with Russia in December. In the third year of Ansei (1856), 
Townsend Harris, the American Consul-General, arrived at 
Shimada. Desirous of concluding a more complete treaty 
with Japan, he visited Edo in the following year, and his 
negotiations with the Shogunate culminated in the conclusion 
of the Japan·American Treaty, in June of the 5th year of 
Ansei (1858). By this treaty, the opening of the five ports 
of Kanagawa, Nagasaki, Niigata, Hyogo and Hakodate, and 
freedom for Americans to reside for the purposes of trade 
in Edo and Osaka were promised. Between July and Sep-
tember of the same year, treaties very similar in content 
were signed with Holland, Russia, Britain and France. Thus, 
what are commonly known as the gokakoku jayaku (treaties 
with five countries) of the fifth year of Ansei were signed. 
In the meantime, opinion was growing in many quarters 
against the opening of the country to foreign intercourse 
and a movement to exclude the foreigners was gaining force. 
The fact that the ShOgunate had concluded the treaties 
above referred to without obtaining the Imperial sanction 
gave many patriots special cause for indignation, and in con-
sequence, the Taira *~ (President of the Council of State 
in Edo in times of emergency). was assassinated outside 
Sakurada Gate by a band of indignant ronin. Some for-
eigners also were the objects of murderous attacks. As the 
domestic unrest grew, the Shogunate, in the first year of 
Bunkyu (1861), approached the signatory countries with a 
request for their consent to the postponement of the opening 
of the ports stipulated in the various treaties. In the third 
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year of Bunkyu (1863), Iemochi <RI'>:, the Shogun, proceeded 
to Kyoto to be received in aud ience by the Emperor, only 
to be enjoined to sweep barbarians away. But when, in 
the first year of Keia (1865), British, French, American and 
Dutch warships came to Settsu from Yokohama and pressed 
for the opening of the port of Hyago, the ShOgunate finally 
succeeded in securing Imperial sanction for this step. It is 
noteworthY that although exclusionist and anti·foreign views 
were finding vigorous expression at the' time, things were, 
as a matter of fact, moving in the direction' of the orening 
of the country to foreign intercourse. 
Thus, the heated controversy over the propriety or 
otherwise of the opening of the country to foreign inter· 
course led to the Shogun's proceeding to Kyoto. It also 
resulted in the dispatch of Tokugawa officials to various 
foreign countries. On the other hand, numbers of patriots 
were vigorously carrying on their activities against the policy 
of the Shogunate, and assassinations took place frequently. 
The troops of the Satsuma, Choshu and other clans, entered 
Kyoto, and the Namamugi affair (the Richardson murder) 
and the bombardment of Shimonoseki by foreign warships 
occurred in rapid succession. In short, with both domestic 
troubles and external difficulties, there was· intense uneasi· 
ness and disturbance throughout the country. 
It is widely believed that Japan is now facing the most 
serious crisis in her history, but it seems that the national 
crisis in the closing years of the ShOgunate was even more 
serious than that which confronts the country today. In 
those days, at home, the old feudal system was beginning to 
crumble away, and, abroad, foreign countries were impor' 
tunately demanding the opening of the country to foreign 
trade, and were threatening to resort to armed force if their 
requests were not complied with. Indeed, the times were. 
critical, in the true sense of the word. It is not my purpose, 
however, to enumerate in the present article the incidents 
which occurred during the fifteen years under review. My 
object is to discuss the measures that were taken to meet 
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the critical situation during that eventful period. 
2. THE NEW SITUATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 
The growth 01 the dl011l1n', influence. In the latter 
half of the Tokugawa period, commerce and industry made 
remarkable progress. Currency found wide circulation and 
the chonin (commercial) class steadily gained influence in 
consequence of the development of urban districts: The 
land economy which had previously prevailed gradually gave 
way to currency economy, and there came into existence a 
new economic influence, that of the chOnin class, which 
existed apart from the agrarian economic influence. Owing 
to these marked economic changes, it was found that the 
samurai class could not maintain their livelihood as under 
the old economic organisation'. Nor was it possible for the 
agricultural communities to feed the samurai class as before. 
Under such circumstances, the samurai in the end had to 
submit to the new economic conditions rely on the financial 
power of the chanin for their subsistence, In some cases 
they either adcpted the ways of the chanin in their daily 
life or turned chonin themselves. On the other hand, the 
chanin class, in virtue of their financial power, came to 
wield considerable social influence. They gained predomi· 
nance over the samurai class, on the one hand, and extended 
their influence even to the agrarian communities, on the 
other. In this way, class distinctions became confused, and 
the feudal system was shaken to its foundations. 
Toyama Kagekata;lti.lIJ~!l1', in his book, Rikenron ;fIJIIli~;;; 
published in the fifth year of Kansei (1793), denounces the 
tendency of merchants to monopolise rights and interests by 
lending money to feudal lords and high samurai, and urges 
the necessity of the Government taking over the business 
of money transactions. He insists that merchants should be 
strictly forbidden to lend money to feudal lords and samurai, 
to whom, he argues, the Government should advance funds 
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distress. To poor farmers also cheap money should be 
supplied hy the Government, and at the same time private 
individuals should be forbidden to lend money. Again, in 
the Shumaiken fOsho lI10/t;jll: 1lf, presented in the third year 
of Keio (1867), the crafty tactics of rice merchants are 
vigorously attacked on the ground that it is very harmful 
to the nation's interests to allow the merchants to manipulate 
the price of rice as they please, and it is urged that the 
Government should monopolise rice rights and initiate a 
kind of rice monopoly system. The underlying motive of 
the propounders of these views was to increase the financial 
power of the Government and to establish official authority 
on a firm basis by curbing the influence of the chonin. 
The Bussan Kaisho !jWilli~Ji)j', or monopolies of provincial 
products, which were established by various clans, may 
presumably be considered as one attempt to achieve the 
above-mentioned objects. 
Progressive ideas. The visit of Commodore Perry's 
squadron took place, as already mentioned, in June of the 
sixth year of Ka-ei (1853), and on July 1st of the same year, 
the Shogunate, in the name of the roju ;g;"" the Council 
of State, communicated the contents of the President's letter 
to the various clans, seeking their frank expression of 
opinion on it. The views submitted in response were 
diverse. Some clans urged that the American demand should 
be rejected even at the risk of war with that country. 
Other clans maintained that Japan's definite reply to the 
American demand should be put off in order to gain time 
to strengthen her defences. More moderate views argued 
that the American demand should be partially accepted so 
as to bring about a peaceful solution. Not a few clans, on 
the othor hand, took the view that the exclusionist policy 
was no longer tenable and that there was no alternative 
but to open the country to foreign intercourse and trade. 
In points of detail, however, the views of these advocates 
of trade with foreign countries were at variance. It is 
true that certain clans (the Gujo clan in Mino province 
. - -.. -- -----
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and the Muramatsu clan in Echigo province, for instance) 
favour the course unconditionally, but many others supported 
it only on a variety of conditions. There was a fairly large 
body of opinion which advocated trade with foreign countries 
for a certain prescribed period - say for five or ten years. 
Of the advocates of this line of policy, the Iwamurata fief 
in Shinano province and the Tsuyama clan in Mimasaku 
province advised the Shogunate to strengthen the coastal 
defences during this period, the Sakma clan in Shimosa 
province was for suspending trade after having tried it, if 
it proved of no benefit to the country, and the Uwajima clan 
in Iyo province and the Shinobu clan in Musashi province 
suggested that trade should be discontinued on completion of 
the defences. Again, the Fukuoka clan in Chikuzen province . 
was in favour of granting trading facilities to America and 
Russia, but not to Britain or France. The course recom· 
mended by the Tsuyama clan in Mimasaku province and the 
Obama clan in Wakasa province was that trade should be 
permitted on condition that it was carried on through the 
intermediary of Dutch merchants. The Hikone clan in Omi 
province submitted the most positive view, viz. that as to 
supply one another's wants is the decree of Heaven, not only 
should the foreign request for trade be granted but that the 
shuinsen *I'P~ (vessels specially permitted by the ShOgunate 
to engage in trade with foreign countries) should be revived 
in order to carryon foreign trade vigorously. Some clans 
were in favour of setting certain restrictions on the volume 
of trade or on the kinds of articles for trading. Memorials 
were also submitted by Mukoyama Gendayu iolllli!l\:t:7<, 
Katsu Rintaro IlJJIiiII;tI>~ and other Shogunate officials, as well 
as by certain scholars at the time urging the necessity of 
accepting the request of foreign countries for intercourse and 
trade. But, I shall refrain from giving here any detailed 
description of the contents of these memorials. A perusal of 
most of the views given above may make us suspect that the 
advocates of foreign trade in those days were largely prompted 
by the idea of gaining time for equipping the country with 
J 
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stronger armaments and defences, and not by any strong 
enthusiasm over the trade itself, but the view of the Hikone 
clan, which supported foreign trade for its own sake, and 
the views of Mukoyama Gendayu and Takashima Kihei 
i:':i .\:';#'1', who maintained that through trade with other 
countries Japan's national wealth and prosperity could be 
enhanced, go to show that there were, at least certain people 
who were firmly convinced of the benefits accruing from 
foreign trade. Even if we admit that most people favoured 
trade only as a temporary expedient for- getting over the 
urgent problem of the moment, the very fact that views in 
favour of the opening of the country could find expression 
in this way is enough to show the marked change that was 
coming over the spirit of the times. 
In his memorial submitted to the Shogunate in October 
of the sixth year of Ka·ei (1853), Takashima Kihei says: 
.. Although the Japanese people are in the habit of tooking 
upon it as a shame to follow the ways of other countries, 
foreigners think highly of those who adopt the ways of 
other nations, because, in their opinion, such people are 
working for the advance of their country's interests. They 
visit many countries and are ready to adopt all the good 
things they can find in the peoples of these countries so as 
to make up for the deficiencies of their own nation. If 
they are eager to make profit out of trade, it is because 
they desire to make their country wealthier and stronger. 
As they are not in the habit of adhering rigidly to old 
customs, they are far from being ashamed of learning from 
others. Indeed, they look down upon those who refuse to 
learn from others as being bigoted." In this way, he 
emphasised the need of seeking knowledge widely in the 
world and adopting any good things in foreign countries to 
make up for the shortcomings of the Japanese people, there· 
by ridding the nation of its antiquated evil habits. Expres· 
sions of opinion of this kind also throw some light on the 
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3. MEASURES TAKEN IN VARIOUS FIELDS TO COPE 
WITH THE CRITICAL SITUATION 
Polity. The Shogunate used to act arbitrarily in the 
administration of both domestic and foreign affairs, but after 
Commodore PerrY's visit, it began to seek Imperial sanction 
for its measures. Even in regard to matters other than 
diplomatic, it came to ask for Imperial guidance. There 
were even cases where it sought the views of the various 
feudal lords on certain problems, instead of shaping its 
course arbitrarily as before. That it asked the various clans 
for a frank expression of opinion on the President's letter, 
already referred to, is a case in point. The Shogunate had 
never before sought the views of the feudal lords at large 
as to the course it should take, and it was thus quite un· 
precedented when it did so on this particular occasion, very 
Eerious though the problem certainly was. This departure 
from its usual ways furnishes a notable proof of the declining 
authority of the Shogunate in its closing years. It also goes 
to show that the idea of deciding State matters by public 
opinion must have been slow ly germ inating. 
In the first year of Man·en (1860), the Shogunate dis· 
patched an envoy to America. Although this was a natural 
outcome of the conclusion of the Ansei' Treaty, it was 
certainly a very extraordinary event to happen under the 
Shogunate which, since its adoption of the exclusionist 
policy, had strictly prohibited Japanese nationals from going 
abroad. In the following year, thot is, in the first year of 
Bunkyij (1861), and in the third year of the same period (1863) 
also, envoys were sent to Europe. Again, in the first year 
of Keio (1865), Shibata Gochu ~~lJillllllf' and others were dis-
patched to England and France in connection with a scheme 
for establishing a dockyard and ironworks; in the next 
year, a mission was sent to Russia, and two years later 
another mission was sent to France, utilising the opportunity 
afforded by an exhibition being held in that country. Be-
sides these envoys, young men were sent abroad for study 
. 
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both by the ShOgunate and by the Satsuma and Chosha 
clans. 
The most important alteration effected in the political 
system was the revision of the sankin kotai'$'Il!'l'Clt system 
(under which the feudal lords had to spend every alternate 
six months or every alternate year in Edo in the Shogun's 
service). The peculiar feudal system of the Tokugawa 
period and the tranquillity that prevailed for some 250 years 
were, no doubt, maintained in consequence of the various 
policies pursued by the ShOgunate, but. they were very 
largely due to the sankin kiitai system. This system was 
part and parcel of the Shogunate and was strictly enforced 
for upwards of 200 years. Under such circumstances, it 
naturally had far-reaching effects on economic and social 
conditions. Towards the end of the Tokugawa period, 
however, the decline of the influence of the Shogunate and 
the increasing financial straits of many feudal lords, which 
developed in them a strong desire to throw off the yoke of 
a system which involved them in heavy expense, rendered 
its strict enforcement difficult. Moreover, as in consequence 
of the increasing complexity of foreign relations, the necessity 
was more and more keenly felt of providing the country 
with stronger defences and armaments and of uniting the 
wbole country into one compact whole in readiness for any 
possible foreign attacks, it was gradually realised that this 
system, which had been invented with the sole object of 
keeping the feudal lords in subjugation, hardly answered 
the requirements of the new situation, and it was finally 
revised in the second year of Bunkyu (1862). 
It is on record that on the last day of February of the 
first year of Ansei (1854), Matsudaira Shungaku t~'I'O/I't~ 
presented a memorial to Abe Masahiro !lnJllillE ">1" of the 
Council of State, emphasising the need of reducing the 
obligatory official visits of feudal lords to Edo to once in 
three or four years so that they could devote their energies 
to the strengthening of national defence. Yokoi Sh6nan 
IIIUF/Hffl also, in a memorial of seven articles presented to 
-----------_ ... __ ._ ..•.. _.-_ .. - .. _--_ .. _-"-._. __ ........ ---.•... --~ 
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the Shogunate in the second year of Bunkyu (1862), recom· 
mended, among other things, the total abolition of the 
sankin kotai system. These recommendations were, however, 
not accepted by the ShOgunate, which refused to do any 
violence to the establ ished system of "ancestral law." 
When, however, Matsudaira Shungaku was appointed Director 
General of Political Affairs by Imperial command in July 
of the second year of BunkyU and came to take active part 
in the Shogunate administration, with Yokoi ShOnan as his 
adviser, he managed to establish a new system in August 
of the same year, which laid down that feudal lords should 
visit Edo once every three years and stay there 100 days 
each time. 
There was fear about this time that, in view of the 
prevailing sentiment of many clans and the dwindling in· 
fluence of the Shogunate, many feudal lords might come to 
defy the sankin kotai system. In carrying out the above· 
mentioned reform Matsudaira Shungaku and other officials 
of the Shogunate were prompted by the desire to avert such 
a contingency. They concluded that it was better to take 
the initiative in effecting a reform and retain something of 
the old system rather than to sit idle and see the whole 
system set at naught by the feudal lords. But as the 
authority of the Shogunate was already on the wane, this 
reform, as perhaps was inevitable under the circumstances, 
had the opposite effect and hastened the collapse of the 
system. It is true that in October of the first year of Genji 
(1864), the old rule was to a certain extent revived and the 
wives and children of feudal lords were ordered to reside 
in Edo, but it is clear from the account given in the Ka·ei-
Meiji Nenkan Roku ¥.rjk DJji5if-r.rJ!I!k that the revived rule was 
not observed. It says, "As the Shogunate, under the reform 
plan of the August of the second year of BunkyU, ordered 
the wives and children of the feudal lords back to their 
respective provinces, nearly all of them had already left 
Edo, when another order was issued recalling them. Very 
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Be that as it may, any reform of the sankin kola! system 
embodied a course incompatible with the traditional policy 
of the ShOgunate. 
Some people of advanced views in those days held that 
the feudal system could no longer be continued and that 
it should be replaced by a new system of gun-ken 'lfl!Jl!f: 
(counties and prefectures), so that the entire country might 
become one united entity in resisting foreign pressure. It 
is clear from the account of the Kaikoku Kigen r,m~;Ig/Jj( 
that Oguri Kozuke-no-Suke 'H\!.U·.!IlJ-1r- stated such a view 
to Katsu Kaishu HtjiliHlt. This idea met with little support 
among the authorities and the gun-ken system was not 
introduced, but the fact that such a view was actually held 
by some people in those days is worthy of special note. 
The ShOgunate effected administrative reforms in other 
directions also. It revised the Government organisatiqn 
during the latter part of the second year of Keio (1866) and 
the following year. Acting on the recommendation of Leon 
Roches, the French Minister, the Shogunate appointed from 
among the roju (Council of State) Directors of the Army, 
the Navy, Home Affairs, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. It 
is noteworthy that the ri'ljzl. in question was put in exclusive 
charge of each of these five departments, for it meant the 
adoption of the administrative system ruling in European 
countries_ Equally deserving of special mention is the fact 
that the Shogunate adopted the policy of assigning important 
posts to men of talent, irrespective of birth or social standing. 
There had previously been a clear line of demarcation 
between the posts open to feudal lords and those for which 
hatamoto (direct retainers of the Shogun) were eligible. 
Again, hatamoto and lower samurai families, themselves 
being of different ranks, had access to such posts only as 
were open to families of their respective status. This rule 
was now set aside and the policy of throwing open important 
posts to men of talent, regardless of their family rank or 
position, was initiated. For instance, whereas under the old 
regime, only lords or high samurai with an annual income 
--_._---_._--'-_._--
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of more than 10,000 koku of rice were eligible for the post 
of wakadoshiyori *¥~ (member of the Council, below the 
rojii), this rule was departed from and Nagai Genban-no-Kami 
)k i1' .»:'1tlWJ1 was promoted to that office from the much 
lower post of 6metsuke :;Idl H. This certainly was another 
bold stroke of policy adopted in defiance of the established 
regulations. 
Armaments. Commodore Perry's visit produced more 
far-reaching effects on armaments than on anything else. 
Accustomed as they were to the tranquillity which had 
prevailed at home for some two hundred years, the samurai 
were neglectful of military training_ Further, their strained 
circumstances had rather directed their attention to the 
question of how to make money. According to certain 
memorials presented to the Shogunate, the visit of the 
American warships found many samurai in possession of no 
armour whatever that could be worn in case of need. 
History records cases where the Shogunate had. previously 
issued orders to have foreign ships driven away, but nothing 
had been done up to that time in the way of increasing 
armaments. In July of the 13th year of Tempo (1842), the 
famous expulsion decree issued on the eighth year of Bunsei 
(1825), was modified, and the new order was to the effect 
that foreign vessels should be asked to leave Japan, after 
having been supplied, if necessary, them with food, fuel and 
fresh water. This change of policy deserves notice. The 
visit of Commodore Perry's squadron to these shores shocked 
the nation and rudely reminded it of the necessity of coastal 
defence - particularly the defence of the Bay of Edo. The 
construction of forts off Shinagawa followed accordingly, in 
August of the six year of Ka-ei (1853). The value of the 
forts was nevertheless called in question by many, who 
contended that hostile vessels might easily draw far out 
where they were secure from bombardment and then return 
to the attack again and again, whenever they found oppor-
tunities. The Satsuma, Mito, Echizen, Saga and Uwajima 
clans, which held such a "iew and saw the need of big 
\ 
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vessels, urged on the Shogunate the necessity of lifting the 
embargo on the construction of big ships. At first, the 
Shogunate, unwilling to act in violence of the ancestral law, 
stubbornly turned a deaf ear to their recommendations, but 
in September of the sixth year of Ka-ei (1853), the embargo 
was finally removed. Not only did the Shogunate then 
advise the various clans to build strong warships but itself 
purchased several warships and about 30 other vessels. In 
home dockyards also, a dozen vessels, warships and others, 
were built. This accounts for the building of the Shogunate 
navy towards the end of the Tokugawa period. In the 
fourth year of Ansei (1857), the Shogunate started work on 
the construction of ironworks at Akunoura, Nagasaki, the 
work being finished in the first year of Bunkyu (1861). 
Seeing, however, that it was not only on a small scale but 
was located far from Edo, the Shogunate, acting on the 
recommendation of Oguri Kozuke-no·Suke, decided to build 
another ironworks at Yokosuka under French management 
and to establish a small dockyard at Yokohama as an adjunct 
to the new Yokosuka Ironworks_ Work on the construction 
of the Yokohama dockyard was started in February of the 
second year of Keio and finished the following year. As 
to the Yokosuka Ironworks, the construction work began 
in March of the second year of Keio (1866), and afterwards 
the work, half-finished, was handed over to the Meiji Govern· 
ment. It proved a useful institution both for repairs and 
for ship-building_ Besides, reverberatory furnace and a gun-
powder factory were established in the first year of Genji 
(1864) and in tbe third year of Keio (1867) respectively. 
Similar institutions were establisbed by the Kagoshima, 
Saga, Mito and other clans also. Reverberatory furnaces 
were built, guns were cast, ships were constructed and 
research was conducted on the manufacture of gunpowder. 
Foreign-style industry. In this way, the increase of 
armaments stimulated the manufacture of arms. But not 
only in the manufacture of arms but in the field of industry 
in general, foreign methods were introduced, a fact which 
.. -.. ----_ .. _--"'-._-_._--_ .... 
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deserves notice as reflecting the effects of the opening of 
the country on the economic life of the Japanese people. 
During the Bunsei period (1818-1829) already, the woolen 
cloth industry was started by the Kagoshima clan, and later 
the manufacture of medicines and glass was also undertaken. 
On his becoming the head of this clan, Shimadzu Nariakira 
~i.1t'J!\'W adopted newer methods of manufacture and built 
factories for the production of glass, ceramics, agricultural 
implements and other artides. The research was extended 
even to gas lighting, telegraphic apparatus and photography. 
It is particularly noteworthy that in the first year of Keio 
(1865). he projected the establishment of a spinning industry 
on the foreign plan, and that this industry was begun in 
the third year of the same period. In the Saga clan too, 
a refinery section was established in the provincial produc· 
tion department of the clan in the fifth year of Ka·ei (1852), 
and it began to conduct experiments on the materials neces· 
sary for firearms such as gunpowder and fulminating powder 
and to manufacture drugs and machinery for chemical in· 
dustry. During the Ansei period (1854-1859), models of 
small steamships and trains were made, and in the first year of 
BunkyU (1861), a factory for manufacturing boilers was estab· 
lished. Some of these industries modelled after the western 
pattern were for the specific purpose of equipping the country 
with more efficient armaments, but some were introduced for 
purposes other than military, and these played an important 
part in developing this country's chemical, electric, spinning 
and other industries. It is interesting to note that in those 
days already, men of advanced views held it necessary to 
develop Japanese economic life by reorganising industry on 
handicraft lines into industry by machinery. 
Foreign Trade. In the field of economy, foreign trade 
was most directly influenced by Commodore Perry's visit. 
In and after the first year of Ansei (1854), the Shogunate 
opened the ports of Shimada, Hakodate, Nagasaki and Kana-
gawa. Later, the port of Yokohama supplanted Kanagawa 
and the port of Kobe was opened in lieu of Hy6go. In 
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those days, Yokohama was the most important trading port, 
and the greatest volume of trade passed through that port. 
Whereas both imports and exports stood at something like 
y 500,000 in the sixth year of Ansei, the figure rose to 
¥ 30,000,000 in the following year (first year of Man'en) and 
in the Keio period exceeded ¥ 60,000,000. The exports in 
those days included articles for shipping use, such as coal 
and charcoal, and marine products, which up to that time 
had figured in the Chinese trade. As new exports to 
Western countries, there were tea, silkworm egg·cards and 
yarns. Trade ceased to be one-sided, export trade being 
carried on as well as import trade. Thus, 'the traditional 
exclusionist policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate was over-
thrown in and after the Ansei period in favour of a new 
policy of foreign intercourse and trade. 
Joint-stock Company, Again, in the matter of busine,s 
management, a new form was introduced, viz, the joint-stock 
company, In June of the third year of Keio (1864), the 
Shogunate decided to make Osaka chanin organise a company 
on a joint-stock basis, At the time, it was in need of 
money to the extent of 800,000 to 900,000 ryo for laying out 
the foreign concessions in Hyogo and Osaka and also for im-
proving facilities for foreign trade. As it was found difficult 
t~ provide this money by means of special levies on big 
merchants, the Shogunate conceived the idea of making 
Osaka merchants establish the above-mentioned company. 
In a written memorial presented by the }wnjobugyiJ ItIn.E:lj§:ff 
and other Shogunate officials appears the following: "Un-
less the company system be adopted, it will be difficult to 
develop trade and advance the nation's interests." It is 
clear that the Shogunate's plan was prompted by the motive 
of introducing the company system of Western countries_ 
It is said that the project to establish such a company was 
under discussion already in the first year of Keio (1865)_ 
Oguri Kozuke-no-Suke, who went to America in the first 
year of Man'en (1860) in the suite of the Japanese Envoy 
and there became acquainted with American finance and 
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economy, was among the foremost advocates of the establish· 
ment of such companies. Fukuzawa Yukichi iliT.iif.liliiilf, in 
his book Seiyii-lijiirlj~nlH~, published in the second year 
of Keiii (1866), dwells on the merits of the company system. 
References to the company system also appear in the Shiinan 
Ikii 'Hiiilf;\!i, published in the second year of Keiii (1866), 
and in the Keizai SIWgaku ~il'f'J,1j! by Kanda Kiihei iiilfl ffi 
:!j':il-" published in the third year of Keiii (1867). From 
this it is obvious that the necessity of running business on 
company lines and of introducing this mode of business 
management was recognised and urged by men of enlightened 
views of the day. The rich merchants of Osaka, however, 
had no experience of foreign trade, nor had they any know· 
ledge of the company system. It was through compulsion 
and against their will that these Osaka merchants established 
a company. No matter what were the circumstances of its 
establishment, it is worthy of special mention that a 
joint·stock company, until then unknown in this country, 
was actually established in the third year of Keiii (1867). 
Although this company was on the lines of the joint'stock 
system of the West, its organisation was far from perfect. 
Needless to say, it was one which would not stand com· 
parison with present·day joint·stock companies, but it must 
nevertheless be admitted that the Shogunate was actuated 
by very progressive ideas when it introduced the company 
system in order to help forward Japanese industry. It may 
fairly be described as a new, advanced line, of policy in 
industry. 
The' Lord of Satsuma had a similar plan in view. A 
contract for the establishment of a company was signed at 
Brussels in the first year of Keio (1865) between Niino 
KyGshG *,,*)lJA fl~ and Godai Tomoatsu JL1-1::!iW., representing 
Satsuma, and a certain Frenchman named Montblanc. In 
pursuance of the terms of this contract, Montblanc came to 
Japan in November of the third year of Keiii (1867', but 
the plan did not materialise after all. 
Finance. The opening of the country affected national 
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finance to a serious extent also. Except during its initial 
period, the Shogunate had always been in financial difficulties, 
and in most cases, the revenue deficit was barely made up, 
by recoinage or by recourse to goyokin (money requisitioned 
from rich merchants). Its financial straits increased in its 
closing years, for the coastal defence, the manufacture and 
purchase of arms, and the establishment of shipyards and 
ironworks, occasioned by the visit of Commodore Perry's 
squadron, involved it in heavy expenditure. To enumerate 
here all items of this new expenditure is impossible. To 
give but a few examples, the construction of the forts off 
Shinagawa costs about 750,000 ryo, the purchases of foreign 
warships and steamers about $ 3,300,000, the establishment 
of the Yokohama Dockyard and the Yokosuka Ironworks 
1,500,000 ryo, and the establishment of the Nagasaki Iron· 
works 50,000 ryii. Besides, the Richardson murder and 
the Shimonoseki affair cost the Shogunate £ 100,000 and 
$ 1,500,000 respectively in the form of indemnities. The 
visit of the ShOgun to Kyoto for his audience with the 
Emperor - an event the like of which hac1 not taken place 
since the Kan·ei period (1824-1643) - and the campaign 
against the Ch6shU clan involved heavy expenditure too. 
In short, in the closing years of the ShOgunate, the 
occurrence of a series of troubles with foreign countries 
and internal disturbances necessitated heavy defrayals in 
entirely new directions. In order to meet this increased 
expenditure, the Shogunate resorted to new methods of issuing 
notes and floating foreign loans, besides having recourse to 
recoinage and goyokin. 
The issue of paper·money. Whenever it found itself in 
financial difficulties, the Shogunate used to realise a good 
amount of profit, sufficient for its needs, by recoinage, and 
this practice saved it from the necessity of issuing paper· 
money. It is true that a plan to issue paper·money had for 
some time been claiming attention, but it was not until the 
third year of Kei6 (1867) that paper· money was actually 
issued by the ShOgunate. This constituted yet another 
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departure from the traditional policy of the Shogunate. In 
and after August of the third year of Keio: the Shogunate 
notes were put into circulation in the Kant5 district, and 
in December of the same year notes were issued in the 
Kansai district also. The former notes were of two kinds 
- one known as Ginza gold notes, which passed in Edo 
and Yokohama only, and the other comprised those 
which circulated in Edo and in the eight provinces of 
Kanto. The latter notes were issued by the company 
established by Osaka millionaires by order of the Shogunate 
at the time of the opening of the port of Hyogo. They 
were gold notes and were put into circulation in the Kinai 
and the neighbouring provinces. Of the two kinds of the 
first·mentioned notes, those the circulation of which was 
restricted to Edo and Yokohama were issued with the object 
of alleviating the shortage of nickel in Yokohama while 
those which were put into circulation in Edo and the eight 
provinces of Kanto were intended to meet financial needs. 
The company's notes were in the nature of compensation 
to the Osaka millionaires for their supplied funds to establish 
the company, though they had, no doubt, important bearings 
on the financial administration of the Shogunate. 
Foreign loans. As regards foreign loans, the Shogunate 
borrowed $ 500,000 from France on the hypothecation of 
the Yokohama Ironworks, and its outstanding account with 
France for purchases of arms amounted to 3,300,000 francs. 
From America it borrowed $ 100,000 - the purchase price of 
the warship Stonewall. It further attempted to obtain a 
loan of 6,000,000 ryo from France to meet the expenses of 
the Chosha campaign, but this scheme fell through. Among 
the feudal lords also, there were many who borrowed money 
from Britain, France or America. Setting apart the size of 
these loans, the fact that foreign loans were raised was a 
thing entirely unknown before. 
The Sanbutsu Kaisho' i:t!IW@1P1i (Monopoly 01 provincial 
it The terms sanbutsu kaisho. kokusan kaisho and bussan kaisho have 
almost the same meaning. 
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products). There is another matter relative to financial 
relief which is worth mentioning. I mean schemes of mono· 
poly. Dazai Shundai ::K*~'$=, in his book Keizairoku ;fill!~$!f< 
illustrates by examples how the feudal lords who adopted a 
monopoly system were in easy financial circumstances. To· 
wards the end of the Tokugawa period, the Shogunate itself 
attempted to adopt a system verging on monopoly. 
During and after the regime of Yoshimune, the eighth 
ShOgun, kokusan kaisho lOIliili1!i"p)l were established by many 
clans. Originally, most of these institutions were intended 
to encourage production, but later such kokusan kaisho as 
were concerned with the sale of provincial products, or, in 
other words, those having the character· of a monopoly, 
increased in number. From the neces.sity of regulating 
prices, the Shogunate often prohibited these monopolies of 
provincial products. In October of the 13th year of TempO 
(1842), it issued instructions to the lords in Kinai, ChUgoku, 
Saigoku and Shikoku provinces vetoing monopolies of pro· 
vincial products. This order was issued in the year following 
the prohibition of wholesale merchants' guilds in the TempO 
Reform, and it is clear that it had the lowering of prices in 
view. The sanbutsu kaisho projected by the Shogunate in 
its closing years were for the double purpose of curbing the 
power of the commercial classes and improving its own 
financial position. 
Both in November of the second year of Ansei (1855) 
and in November of the first year of Keio (1865), the 
ShOgunate attempted to establish sanbutsu kaisho. On the 
former occasion, it was in serious financial straits in con· 
sequence of both a succession of natural calamities, such as 
earthquakes and tidal waves, that devastated many provinces 
and the frequent visits of foreign warships. Concluding 
that extraordinary measures were inevitable in extraordinary 
times, the Shogunate worked out a plan, according to which 
the products of the various provinces were to be forwarded 
to Edo by the daikan (local magistrate) in the case of the 
goryo (ShOgun's estates) and by feudal lords in the case of 
F 
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private fiefs, so that these products might be sold at four 
or five sanbutsu kaisho to be established at suitable places, 
to chanin among others. It was thought that .if, under this 
plan, these institutions were made to contribute part of the 
proceeds to the coffers of the Shogunate, the arrangement 
might serve to eliminate the predominant financial power 
of the merchants, at whose mercy many feudal lords lay 
on account of their indebtedness to them. 
The similar scheme conceived in the first year of Keio 
aimed chiefly at the recovery of commercial rights so that 
the government could regulate the prices of commodities. 
It was then proposed that bussan kaisho be established at 
four or five different places in Edo where transport facilities 
were available, and that certain people in the wholesale 
business be commissioned to transact the business of these 
institutions. Osaka and other places, it was' further planned, 
should have similar institutions, if necessary. The com· 
modities for sale should be rice and other daily necessaries 
and the necessary funds be provided by the Shogunate and 
the chimin. One per cent. of the profits should be reserved 
for the kaisho and the rest c;Iistributed among the contributors 
of the funds in proportion to the amounts of their contribu· 
tions. Neither of the sanbulsu kaisho plans evolved on these 
two occasions was, however, carried out. 
Inquiry into sources of revenue. At the' time when the 
government organisation of the Shogunate was reformed in 
the second and third years of Keio, financial reform also 
was planned. The land tax constituted the main part of 
the revenue of the Shogunate. It is true that it had miscel-
laneous incomes in the form of offertories, but' these were 
insignificant in amount. The French Minister, Leon Roches, 
advised the Government to levy taxes on houses, land, com-
mercial profits, sake, tobacco, raw silk, tea and shipping. 
He urged the necessity of creating direct and indirect taxes 
in order to put finance on a stable basis. It is said that 
the Shogunate, following his advice, actually started investi-
gations of the taxable objects. 
., 
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4. CONCLUSION 
In the foregoing chapters, I have described the various 
policies pursued by the Shogunate in various directions in 
its closing days. To sum up, the visit of Commodore Perry's 
squadron, which took place at a time when the political, 
social and economic conditions of this country had been 
undergoing marked changes through the rise of a new 
economic power, shocked the nation and accentuated the 
unrest in political, social and economic circles. In order to 
cope with this new situation, the ShOgunate had to adopt 
many measures which were manifestly irreconcilable with 
its traditional policy. In politics, military matters, finance 
and economy, emergency measures were devised, and the 
view even found expression that the feudal system should 
be abolished. It is said that the numerous reforms effected 
in quick succession by the Shogunate put I wakura Tomomi 
~it JUdi" Sakamoto Ryiima ;J!i(*jf~JI; and Kido Koin *J5 
"f:1C - heroes of the Meiji Restoration - on their guard, as 
they thought it possible that the Tokugawa administration 
might, after all, recover its former strength. Such a thing 
did not, however, come to pass. The battles at Toba and 
Fushimi were quickly followed by the downfall of the 
Shogunate, and the Meiji Restoration was consummated. 
As the opening of the country was a fait accompli and as, 
indeed, there was no other COllrse to follow, this policy was 
maintained after the Restoration, and capitalistic economy 
was introduced from the West with even greater zeal, as 
was indeed natural under the circumstances. As the slogan 
of anti-foreignism was, as a matter of fact, meant as a lever 
with which to compass the downfall bf the Shogunate, it 
was discarded, once the Restoration had been effected, and 
the policy of friendly intercourse with other countries was 
proclaimed_ This was also in the natural order of things. 
Things had already been moving in this direction, as can 
be seen from the fact that in spite of the prevalence of 
exclusionist views in some quarters in the last fifteen years 
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of the Shogunate, new knowledge was being lagerly in· 
troduced from Western countries. Thus, it may be said 
that the last fifteen years of the Shogunate denote at once 
the period in which the ShOgunate was going the way of 
decay and the period in which the Meiji Restoration was 
being prepared. 
N.B. The lLlnar calendar had been used in Japan till the Meiji 
Government. for the first time. adopted the solar calend<lr. The dates 
(according to the former) in this essay, therefore, do not agree with those 
according to the latter. 
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